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Abstract: - Resilience, as a property of a system, must transition from just a buzzword to an operational 
paradigm for system management, especially under future climate change. Identifying the need for system 
resilience requires defining the system. Revolutionary advances in hardware, networking, information and human 
interface technologies require new ways of thinking about how sociotechnical, cyber-physical, and systems of 
systems are conceptualized, built and evaluated. The aim of this paper is to start a development process for a 
design theory (DT) for resilient systems (DT4RS). With the help of DT4RS, communities are able to develop 
and operate different information and security technologies, and share knowledge and best practices. 
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1 Introduction 
Figure 1 presents the domain of sociotechnical cyber-
physical systems. Past sociotechnical systems were 
physical systems, including only the human layer and 
the platform layer, as shown in figure 2a. Current 
sociotechnical systems are software-intensive 
systems (SIS) as shown in figure 2b. SIS’ future trend 
is that the software layer (=cyber part) is growing, as 
illustrated in figure 2c. All SIS are also cyber-
physical systems (CPS): human and platform layers 
form the physical part and the software layer forms 
the cyber part of the CPS. 
 
Fig. 2 Software-intensive system trends [1] 
 
According to Jamshidi [2], systems of systems 
(SoS) means “a SoS is an integration of a finite 
number of constituent systems which are independent 
and operable, and which are networked together for a 
period of time to achieve a certain higher goal.” 
The human body is inherently resilient in its 
ability to persevere through infections or trauma, but 
our society’s critical infrastructure lacks the same 
degree of resilience, typically losing essential 
 Fig. 1 Variety of sociotechnical cyber-physical 
system 
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functionality following adverse events [3]. Resilient 
systems are able to minimize the negative impacts of 
adverse events on societies and sustain or even 
improve their functionality by adapting to and 
learning from fundamental changes caused by those 
events [3]. Our society’s critical sociotechnical CPS 
— communication, energy, water, transportation, 
finance, healthcare— lacks of resilience, typically 
losing essential functionality following adverse 
events [3]. Resilience, as a property of a system, must 
transition from just a buzzword to an operational 
paradigm for system management. Identifying the 
need for system resilience requires defining the 
system. Revolutionary advances in hardware, 
networking, information and human interface 
technologies require new ways of thinking about how 
CPS are conceptualized, built and evaluated [1]. 
Our research goal is to develop an information 
systems design theory for resilient software-intensive 
systems (DS4RS) so that communities developing 
and operating different security technologies can 
share knowledge and best practices using a common 
frame of reference. By a sound design theory, the 
outputs of these communities will combine to create 
more resilient systems, with fewer vulnerabilities and 
an improved stakeholder sense of security and 
welfare. 
 
 
2 Design Theory Development 
Designing security for software-intensive systems is 
challenging since the technologies that make up these 
systems, e.g., operating systems, databases, 
networks, and the world-wide web, have traditionally 
used different models for security. Furthermore, the 
communities that develop these technologies do not 
systematically learn from each other’s best practices 
in designing for security [4]. 
In the operating system community, the necessity 
to distinguish the level of privilege required to run 
code from that required to read a file or access other 
resources is well-known. Also, before any code is run 
on a system, the originator of the code should be 
authenticated and authorized or acknowledged as 
trusted by the user [4]. These design principles and 
security mechanisms have been expressed more than 
three decades ago. On the other hand, the database 
development and operations communities still allow 
Structured Query Language injection attacks to cause 
significant damage to businesses and consumers 
(e.g., reputation damage, financial loss, identity theft, 
etc.) by not properly observing these design 
principles. The development, networking, and 
operations communities have made similar mistakes. 
Examples are routing advertisements as parameters 
to code that modify critical shared resources – routing 
tables on the Internet – service providers have 
frequently allowed information that is transported 
over the Internet to be misrouted and delivered to a 
hacker’s network or machine. However, all informed 
security communities understand that security 
benefits from following an appropriate design 
process in the context of a system lifecycle [4]. 
Gregor and Jones [5] define six core components 
of design theory and two additional components that 
are shown in Table I. Next section of this paper 
proposes our design theory for resilient software-
intensive systems with regard to the six core 
components. 
 
 
3 Proposed Elements of Design Theory 
for Resilient Systems 
 
3.1 The Purpose and Scope 
The main purpose for designing resilient systems is 
how to return privacy and trust in digital world and 
to gain a global competitive edge in security-related 
business, such as critical infrastructures. The 
purpose, with regard to security, is to know what is 
going on and what will happen in the network(s), and 
to be aware of the current level of security in the 
network(s), how to design or build-in security and 
resiliency to a networked environment, and to define 
trade-offs for security and privacy levels versus 
system’s usability. The overall aim is to mitigate 
cyber security risks, which in its turn supports the 
business continuity and operations of the whole 
society. 
 
3.2 Constructs 
3.2.1 Resilient Systems 
Resilience means that a system or infrastructure is 
able to adapt to changing conditions. In the case of 
information security, resilience is based on run-time 
situational awareness and a priori risk analysis. 
 
3.2.2 Situational Awareness 
Situational Awareness involves being aware of what 
is happening around one to understand how 
information, events, and one’s own actions affect the 
goals and objectives, both now and in the near future.  
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The most important enablers of situational 
awareness are observations, analysis, visualization, 
and cyber-policy of the government.  
 
3.2.3 Security Technology 
Security technologies include all technical means 
towards cyber security, such as secure system 
architectures, protocols and implementation, as well 
as tools and platforms for secure system development 
and deployment. 
 
3.2.4 Security Management and Governance 
Security management and governance covers the 
human and organizational aspects of information 
security. Its focus areas include: (1) Security policy 
development and implementation, and (2) 
Information security investment, incentives, and 
trade-offs. Information security management system 
(ISMS) means continuously managing and operating 
system by documented and systematic establishment 
of the procedures and process to achieve 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of the 
organization’s information assets that do preserve 
[6]. 
 
3.3 Principles of Form and Function 
Trustworthy and secure technologies and platforms 
are a basis to build on. As the security risks continue 
to increase with cybercrime and other unauthorized 
access, the security solutions and management of IT 
security need systematic design and constant 
development. Figure 3 shows the new systematic 
approaches towards resilient software-intensive 
systems. Both the resilient system and the situation 
awareness system are SISs. Security technologies are 
applied in and between their platform and software 
layers. Trust management is the main tool in and 
between human layers. 
Software-intensive systems consist of three 
layers: the platform layer, the software layer and the 
human layer. Every cyber-secure system consists of 
two SISs: the proper resilient system, and the 
situational awareness system that is the main 
prerequisite towards cyber security. A complex SIS 
is a system of software-intensive sub-systems, which 
platform layers compose a physical network, 
software layers compose a software network and 
human layers compose a social network, as shown in 
figure 4. Cyber security should be systematically 
built up at all layers and networks. The resilient 
Table I. Eight components of an Information System Design Theory 
 
Component Description 
Core components 
Purpose and scope (the causa finalis) “What the system is for,” the set of meta-requirements or goals that specifies the type of artifact to which the theory applies and in conjunction also defines the scope, or boundaries, of the theory. 
Constructs (the causa materialis) Representations of the entities of interest in the theory. 
Principle of form and function  
(the causa formalis) 
The abstract “blueprint” or architecture that describes an IS artifact, either product or 
method/intervention. 
Artifact mutability The changes in state of the artifact anticipated in the theory, that is, what degree of artifact change is encompassed by the theory. 
Testable propositions Truth statements about the design theory. 
Justificatory knowledge The underlying knowledge or theory from the natural or social or design sciences that gives a basis and explanation for the design (kernel theories). 
Additional components 
Principles of implementation  
(the causa efficiens) 
A description of processes for implementing the theory (either product or method) in specific 
contexts. 
Expository instantion A physical implementation of the artifact that can assist in representing the theory both as an expository device and for purposes of testing. 
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physical network (composed by blue arrows in figure 
4) is the basis on which the information sharing 
between different stakeholders could be created via 
software layers (green arrows). However, the trust 
inside social networks (red arrows) quantifies the 
pieces of information that will be shared, - and with 
whom. 
The design principles towards trust-building 
includes: 
1. Proactive – design for security. A proactive 
model of information security that is driven by 
knowledge of vulnerabilities, threats, assets, potential 
attack impacts, the motives and targets of potential 
adversaries. 
2. Self-healing – utilizing the toolbox. Novel and 
effective tools and methods to cope with challenges 
of dynamic risk landscape with self-healing. 
3. Public awareness – increase trust. Enable 
seamless cyber security integration to every-day life. 
By efficiently utilizing tools and methods, 
stakeholders can co-operate while protecting their 
privacy, they can create more sophisticated security 
policies, media publicity can move from threats to 
opportunities and public awareness and 
understanding will move towards accepting cyber 
security as a natural element of a connected world. 
 
3.4 Artifact Mutability 
From every indication, the growth of the software 
layer, in size and percentage of the overall systems, 
will be the future trend [1]. The role of software will 
become dominant in nearly all complex systems. 
Thus, research and development in SIS must actively 
address the challenges of using software as the 
primary building material in future complex systems 
[1]. According to Hevner and Chatterjee [1], in the 
future world of pervasive computing and ubiquitous 
cyber-physical devices, it will be essential that IT 
artifacts and the integrated systems containing these 
artifacts be reliable, adaptable, and sustainable. 
Design for SIS should draw its foundations from 
multiple research disciplines and paradigms in order 
to effectively address a wide range of system 
challenges. According to Hevner and Chatterjee [1], 
the most important intellectual drivers of future 
science of design in SIS research will be dealing with 
complexity, composition and control. Hanseth and 
Lyytinen [7] adopt the viewpoint of designers: how 
to ‘cultivate’ an installed base and promote its 
dynamic growth by proposing design rules for 
information infrastructure (II) bootstrapping and 
adaptive growth. Within their design rules, the II 
designers would have to prefer continuous, local 
innovation to increase chaos and to apply simple 
designs and crude abstractions. According to Hanseth 
and Lyytinen [7], this change is not likely, as design 
communities are often locked into institutional 
patterns that reinforce design styles assuming vertical 
control and complete specifications. 
 
3.5 Testable propositions  
This section present the truth statements of DT4RS.  
  
3.5.1 Resilience 
The overall target of cyber security is that all systems 
and infrastructures are resilient. Resilience is based 
on integrating two parallel subtasks: (1) run-time 
situation awareness and (2) a priori risk analysis. On 
the other hand, resilience itself is a twofold topic: (1) 
the system has to be robust against attacks, i.e., the 
attack is prevented in its first phase, and (2) the 
system has to be able to return to a safe state after the 
attack. Healing requires that utilized data and system 
operation can be restored as soon as possible. 
Therefore, healing processes have to be trained and 
tested. 
 
 
Fig.3 Systematic approach towards resilient 
software-intensive systems 
 
 
Fig.4 Software-intensive system of systems 
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3.5.2 Situational Awareness  
Situation Awareness is the main prerequisite towards 
cyber security. Without situation awareness, it is 
impossible to systematically prevent, identify, and 
protect the system from the cyber incidents and if, for 
example, a cyber-attack happens, to recover from the 
attack. Situation awareness involves being aware of 
what is happening around your system to understand 
how information, events, and how your own actions 
affect the goals and objectives, both now and in the 
near future. It also enables to select effective and 
efficient countermeasures, and thus, to protect the 
system from varying threats and attacks.  
Situational awareness is needed for creating a 
sound basis for the development and utilization of 
countermeasures (controls), where resiliency 
focuses. For the related decision-making, relevant 
information collected from different sources of the 
cyber environment or cyberspace, e.g., networks, risk 
trends, and operational parameters, are needed. This 
requires information exchange between different 
stakeholders. And always, when dealing with 
information exchange, the main question is “trust”.  
 
3.5.2 Security technology 
Security technologies include all technical means 
towards cyber security, such as secure system 
architectures, protocols and implementation, as well 
as tools and platforms for secure system development 
and deployment. Security technologies are needed 
for fulfilling the recognized security requirements, 
and for building resilient infrastructures and systems 
with dependable hardware and software that can also 
meet future security challenges.  
Security technologies enable technical protection 
of infrastructures, platforms, devices, services, and 
data. The technical protection starts with secure user 
identification and authorization that are necessary 
features in most secure infrastructures, platforms, 
devices and services. Fortunately, well-known 
technologies exist for their implementation. 
Typically, processes and data objects are associated 
with an owner, represented in the computer system 
by a user account, who sets the access rights for 
others. A global trend is to increase the use of cloud 
service technology when providing critical services. 
Data go into a cloud and will not come back to end-
users’ devices. Also, government data has already 
gone to a cloud, and in the future more and more 
government data will migrate to cloud servers and 
services. Partnerships between cloud service 
providers and security solution providers are 
becoming more common. We will see the emergence 
of cloud service-specific-solution providers as well. 
Identity management and encryption will be the most 
important cloud security services to be offered. These 
services will be eventually offered for small to 
medium-sized businesses as well. We will also see 
emergence of cloud security standards. Challenges 
are that quite often cloud service providers believe 
that security is just an end user issue and firewall 
means security. Therefore, currently, we do not have 
proper cloud security standards and we lack 
awareness of a true understanding of comprehensive 
cloud security.  
Security technologies are needed also then if 
something has happened. For example, forensics can 
lead to the sources of the attack/mistake and provide 
information for legal and other ramifications of the 
issue. Forensics also facilitates the analysis of the 
causes of the incident, which in turn, makes it 
possible to learn and avoid similar attacks in the 
future. 
 
3.5.3 Security management and governance 
The well-known fact of live is that people are the 
rock-bottom of cyber security. Security management 
and governance, “the brain and Intelligence of cyber 
security” takes care the human and organizational 
aspects of cyber security.  
Security policy is currently the main element used 
to communicate secure work practices to employees 
and ICT stakeholders. It is a declaration of the 
significance of security in the business of the 
organization in question. Additionally, the security 
policy defines the organization’s policies and 
practices for personnel collaboration. However, 
people still often fail to comply with security 
policies, exposing the organization to various risks. 
One challenge is to promote methods and techniques 
that can support the development of comprehensible 
security policies in the emerging ICT paradigms, e.g., 
cloud computing and multiple devices. Developing 
of policies that can defeat the main reasons driving 
non-compliance, such as a habit, is challenging.  
ISMS provides controls to protect organizations’ 
most fundamental asset, information. Many 
organizations apply audits and certification for their 
ISMS to convince their stakeholders that security of 
organization is properly managed and meets 
regulatory security requirements [8]. An information 
security audit is an audit on the level of information 
security in an organization. Security aware customers 
may require ISMS certification before business 
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relationship is established. Unfortunately, ISMS 
standards are not perfect and they possess potential 
problems. Usually guidelines are developed using 
generic or universal models that may not be 
applicable for all organizations. Guidelines based to 
common, traditional practices take into consideration 
differences of the organizations and organization 
specific security requirements [9]. 
 
3.6 Justified Knowledge  
The approach proposed is derived from the science of 
critical infrastructures, cyber trust/trust building, and 
complex software-intensive systems presented.  
 
 
4 Discussion and Conclusions 
The choice properties and design aspects described in 
this study are a proposed start to a design theory for 
resilient SISs. The next future work is to cover the 
additional components of ISDT presented in Table I. 
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